Much of the intuition about primary elections and their effect on candidate behavior comes from our knowledge of presidential primaries. In presidential elections, primary voters are often more ideologically extreme than are general-election voters (Norrander 1989; Polsby and Wildavsky 1978) ,1 and delegates to presidential-nominating conventions are more extreme than the broader electorate (McClosky, Hoffman, and O'Hara 1960; Soule and McGrath 1975; Stone and Rapoport 1994) . This divergence between the two constituencies presents presidential candidates with a strategic dilemma: how can they please the primary constituency enough to secure the nomination, but still maintain electability in the general election? Existing research indicates that presidential candidates respond to this strategic dilemma by moving toward their primary base to secure the nomination (Aldrich 1995; Polsby and Wildavsky 2004; Schlesinger 1991) .2
In principle, this story should also apply at the congressional level, where candidates face a similar two-stage election. Do congressional candidates also diverge from the general-election constituency and steer toward their primary base? To answer this question, we must answer two preliminary questions: (1) Do congressional candidates face a strategic-positioning dilemma between divergent primary and general electorates? and (2) If the primary-and general-election constituencies diverge in congressional elections, then how do congressional candidates respond to the strategic dilemma?
This article examines each question in turn. First, we argue that congressional candidates do, in fact, face an important strategicpositioning dilemma. We show that primary constituencies tend to favor more-extreme candidates than do general-election constituencies, and challengers create a credible electoral threat for incumbents by catering to the primary constituency. Second, we argue that, given this strategic dilemma, congressional candidates hew to the preferences of the primary constituency. We show that primary losses are most likely to occur among ideologically moderate legislators who diverge from the primary constituency -but these losses are strikingly rare. In addition, we find that candidates learn, over time, to position themselves close enough to the primary constituency to ward off electoral defeat.
In the next section, we discuss in greater depth the strategic dilemma faced by congressional candidates. We go on to examine empirically the nature of the strategic-positioning dilemma, including the divergence between the primary-and general-election constituencies and the behavior of primary challengers. We then address the question of candidate response to this strategic dilemma. We rely primarily on data collected from America Votes, which includes the vote totals of all candidates running in congressional elections (primaries and generals) between 1956 and 1998.3 In the final section, we conclude and outline the continuing research project.
Strategic Choices in Congressional Primaries
Examining the relationship between congressional primaries and candidate positioning involves a two-part argument. Before considering what the rational ideological position of the candidate is, we must first consider whether or not congressional candidates face a real strategic dilemma in how to position themselves between the two constituencies. Are there truly two distinct constituencies that force the candidate into a strategic choice? For a strategic dilemma to exist for a congressional candidate, the preferences of the primary electorate must be distinct from the preferences of the general electorate, and there must be a credible threat of electoral loss presented by a primary challenger. Previous research on the Senate has found some empirical support for this two-constituency hypothesis (Brady and Schwartz 1995; Francis et al. 1994; Gerber and Morton 1998; Schmidt, Kenny, and Morton 1996) , but research on the House remains scant, partly because finding consistent data on House primary constituencies and challengers is difficult. Nonetheless, we can derive three key observable hypotheses that would indicate the presence of a strategic positioning dilemma.
First, candidates who are at, or too close to, the preferences of their general-election constituency should fare worse in primary elections. Previous research has shown that candidates who are out of line with the general district constituency are more likely to lose in the general election (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002) . If there are two distinct constituencies, then candidates who do well in one (the general) should do worse in the other (the primary). Second, ideologically moderate candidates should be more likely to attract primary opposition. Divergent preferences in the primary electorate present a threat to the incumbent only if primary challenges are somehow tied to ideology. If primary challengers never punished incumbents for ideological moderation, then the strategic dilemma would not exist even if voter preferences diverged. Third, primary challengers should position themselves close to the preferences of the primary-election constituency. Incumbents face a credible threat of loss only when challengers cater to the primary constituency. Then incumbents are punished for ideological moderation with more ideologically based challenges in the primary. If these three conditions hold, then they would substantiate the idea that congressional candidates face a strategic-positioning dilemma. The first demonstrates a divergence in the preferences of the two constituencies, and the next two show that a credible threat of electoral loss exists (in spite of the fact that few incumbents actually lose primary elections).4
Once we have established the existence of a strategic dilemma, our basic problem becomes one of candidate positioning. If the primaryand general-election constituencies diverge, then candidates must decide where to position themselves between the two. Obviously, candidates might try to use Richard Nixon's strategy of "run to the right" in the primaries and then "run to the middle" in the general election. But this strategy seems challenging for congressional candidates, since congressional incumbents (the focus of this study and most others in the congressional-elections literature) build up a single, much longer legislative record than do presidential candidates. In addition, because most congressional elections are low-salience affairs for the general public, they become even more salient for small groups of primary voters (Key 1 956), who would recognize -and likely punisha candidate who tried to straddle the line between the two constituencies. This punishment could occur in the primary or the general election, where elite activists often mobilize other voters and candidates who are out of step with the electorate are more likely to lose (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002) . Tacking back and forth between the two constituencies thus presents a risky choice for risk-averse legislators (see Mann 1978 for a description of nervous incumbents). Moreover, candidates have to protect their reputations for reliability. Perceptions of flip-flopping, or even a lack of clarity about candidate positions, can hurt candidates in elections (Alvarez 1997) .5 It is certainly possible that, under some circumstances, candidates can portray their record one way in a primary election and in a different light for the general election, but there are grave risks involved. At a minimum, candidates will do what they can to avoid those risks.
How, then, will candidates position themselves? We argue that congressional candidates, like their presidential counterparts, are forced to please their primary-election constituency by positioning themselves away from the median voter. The Downsian model (1957) predicts that rational candidates will converge to the median voter. A large body of empirical research has demonstrated, however, that congressional candidates and parties consistently diverge from each other (see, for example, Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001 ; Wright 1997, 2005; Poole and Rosenthal 1991; and Shapiro et al. 1990 ).6 Formal theory has specified a variety of reasons why candidate divergence might emerge from spatial competition, including factors such as differential turnout, party activists, potential third-party candidates, and the policy preferences of candidates themselves (see, for instance, Aldrich 1983; Enelow and Hinich 1982; Fiorina 1974; Grofman 2004; Snyder 1994; and Wittman 1977) .7 In particular, work by Aranson and Ordeshook (1972) , Coleman (1971) , and Owen and Grofman (2004) finds that a two-stage electoral process can lead to divergence of candidate positions, particularly when the model allows for some strategic voting among primary voters. When faced with two separate constituencies, in other words, candidates can, under many circumstances, rationally choose an ideologically more-extreme position.8
This strategic choice is challenging to demonstrate empirically, since the observable implications of candidates catering to a primary constituency are difficult to untangle from other potentially polarizing effects (such as partisanship or personal ideology). Nonetheless, we can examine data on primary losses and candidate responses to historical shifts in the number of primary losses. If candidates respond to the strategic dilemma by steering toward their primary base, then we should observe two trends. First, primary losses should occur primarily among ideologically moderate candidates. These candidates are punished for making the wrong choice, while candidates who cater to the primary constituency are not. Second, historical change should have an impact on the decision calculus of congressional candidates: as candidates learn that primary losses can be a serious threat, the number of primary losses should decline relative to the number of general-election losses. In the post-World War II era, the number of primary losses increased significantly around the late 1960s and early 1970s, perhaps due to the explosion of electioneering among organized interests. Thus, we expect that since the 1970s, members have positioned themselves closer to their primary constituencies.
In sum, there are two main parts to our argument. First, many congressional candidates face a strategic dilemma in how to position themselves between the general and primary electorates. Second, candidates generally respond to this dilemma by hewing to the primary electorate. Substantiating each of these assertions empirically is difficult, but we rely on a set of observable conditions that should be true. To show that the strategic dilemma exists, we demonstrate that (1) the dynamics of candidate ideology and election outcomes are opposite in primary elections from what they are in general elections, (2) ideologically moderate candidates are more likely to draw challengers, and (3) primary challengers position themselves to the left of Democratic incumbents and to the right of Republican incumbents. To show that candidates respond to this dilemma by steering toward their primary base, we demonstrate that (1) primary losses are most likely to occur among ideologically moderate candidates, and (2) congressional candidates learn over time to cater to the primary base.
The Strategic Dilemma between Primary-and General-Election Constituencies To determine if a difference exists in the preferences of the primary constituency and the general constituency, we first looked at the kinds of candidates who tend to do well in the primary election. As previously noted, candidates who ideologically stray from their generalelection constituency do worse in general elections (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002) . The opposite should be true for candidates in primaries. We developed a measure of the candidate's distance from the general-election constituency. Like earlier researchers (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2000; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Wright 1993, 1997) , we used presidential vote as a measure of the district's general preferences.9 To measure distance from the general electorate, we regressed candidate ideology, measured by first-dimension DW-Nominate scores, on presidential vote in the district. Figure 1 presents a graph of the results for one fairly representative year.
In the graph, candidates who are perfectly in step with their constituency are represented as falling very close to the predicted line. Candidates who diverge from their general-district preferences are represented above or below the line. The distance between a legislator's graphed position and the line (the residual) is a measure of the member's ideological distance from the general-election constituency. The larger the residual, the further the member is from the general-election constituency.10 Note that the sign of the residual also matters. In particular, we expect that Republican candidates pulled by their primary constituencies will (on average) be more conservative than their district and will be represented above the line (positive residuals). Conversely, Democratic candidates pulled by their primary constituencies should generally be more liberal and be graphed below the line (negative residuals). Thus, candidates who have positioned themselves away from the more-moderate general-election constituency in the expected direction should win a larger share of the primary vote than their counterparts who voted closer to the district median.
The basic model is a regression of the incumbent's percentage of the primary vote on the incumbent's ideological position relative to the general electorate.11 We ran the regressions separately for each party, since we expected Republicans and Democrats to have effects in opposite directions. Democrats who are more liberal should be safer in the primary election, while Republicans who are more conservative should be safer. In both models, we restricted the sample to contested races.12 The main independent variable of interest in all three models is a measure of distance from the general-election constituency. All three models also included a dichotomous variable for southern states (defined as the Confederacy) to control for the possibility that the effects of primary elections are different in the one-party South (Black and Black 2002) , and a second dummy variable for redistricting, since this process can effectively give the incumbent a new constituency base and alter the relationship between the incumbent and constituents.13 We also included a variable for the number of terms the incumbent served in the House, since less-experienced candidates have had less time to build up their primary constituencies (Fenno 1978) . Because some previous research has found that the ideology of winning candidates in closed primaries is more extreme than the ideology of winning candidates in open primaries (Gerber and Morton 1998), we included two variables for the type of primary election: open primaries (where voters need not be registered partisans to participate) and closed primaries (where voters must be a declared partisan ahead of time). Semi-closed primaries (where voters may register on the day of the primary) are the omitted category.14 Finally, to ensure that our results would not be confounded by the level of competitiveness in the race (Jacobson 2001) , we examined two measures of competitiveness: the total number of challengers in the race and the total amount of money raised in the election (included as a logged variable).15 Because morecompetitive races have more challengers and higher fiind-raising levels, we can see how competitiveness affects the relationship between candidate positioning and primary vote outcomes. Table 1 presents the results of these regressions. The results are largely consistent with our predictions, particularly regarding Democrats. In the first model, the key variable -distance from the general-election constituency -is significant in the expected direction for both parties: Republicans who are more conservative and Democrats who are more liberal than their districts have higher vote margins in the primary election. The substantive effect is modest, since becoming one standard deviation more conservative relative to the general-election constituency is equivalent to a 1% increase in Republican vote shares and a 1% decrease in Democratic vote. The main effect on our key variable of interest is the opposite of what we observe in general elections and implies that there is a divergence between the two constituencies.
The coefficients on the other variables are also consistent with our predictions. Southern Democrats and incumbents affected by redistricting generally have lower primary vote margins. Southern Democrats generally received 4% fewer votes than their counterparts. This finding is consistent with the history of the one-party South, during which the general election was meaningless and, instead, the Democratic primary was the actual deciding election (Black and Black 2002) . Redistricting also lowers incumbent vote percentages by about 4% in both parties, as new voters are brought into the district. In addition, if we hold member ideology constant, we find that seniority helps incumbents. Members who have had time to build up a primary constituency in the district gain about half a percentage point with each year of experience. Closed primaries have a negative effect on vote margins, producing more-contested races, but open primaries have no statistically significant effect.16
The variable with the largest substantive impact in the first model in Table 1 is the total number of challengers. Obviously, the more 
•2 I § H g & II 1p
. <^> * I I lî challengers there are, the more difficult it is to garner large majorities. For both parties, each additional challenger lowers the incumbent's primary vote percentage by approximately 12%. This variable has an interesting relationship to money. Because of the relatively few years of data available from the FEC, we lose approximately half of the cases when we add the variable for total amount of money raised (second model in Table 1 ). Nonetheless, we can see that money is associated with competitiveness, because margins are lower in the races with high levels of fund-raising. In addition, among Democrats, the relationship between candidate ideology and primary vote margin remains the same: Democratic incumbents who are ideologically further from their district do better in the primary. Among Republicans, the sign for our key ideology variable is still in the right direction, but the significance is diminished. We suspect that this decrease is due to the loss of a number of cases and that additional cases would reduce the uncertainty surrounding this coefficient. In fact, adding total funds raised to the model increases uncertainty around all of our variables. Tests for multicollinearity indicated that the total amount of money raised and the total number of challengers were highly collinear.
For the third model, we thus dropped the total number of challengers and included only total amount raised. The explanatory power of the third model decreases considerably, and the substantive effect of variables like ideological positioning and redistricting increases considerably. In this model, a one-standard-deviation increase in conservatism relative to the general district results in a 2% jump in vote margin for Republicans and a 2.5% drop for Democrats. Redistricting now has a huge effect, decreasing Republican vote percentages by about 15% and Democratic vote percentages by 12%. These results indicate that a key factor in determining the incumbent's primary vote margin is the number of challengers the incumbent draws, whether because of redistricting or ideological positioning.
These findings lay the groundwork for examining the second condition necessary for a strategic dilemma to exist. We hypothesized that candidates who are ideologically more moderate render themselves vulnerable and are more likely to draw primary opposition. The findings in Table 2 confirm this hypothesis. We ran a simple regression of the number of primary challengers on the incumbent's ideological distance from the general-election constituency. We also included controls for the South, redistricting, seniority, and the incumbent's vote percentage in the previous general election and primary election. These variables all control for competitiveness, helping us to see the independent effect of candidate ideology. As expected, Democrats who are conservative and Republicans who are liberal relative to their districts are significantly more likely to draw primary opposition. Interestingly, candidates with higher vote margins in the previous general election are slightly more likely to draw opposition in the primary, even though they are presumably safer in the general election. Candidates with higher vote margins in the previous primary election are less likely to draw challengers. This finding reinforces the idea that the two constituencies are, in fact, quite different. It also indicates that candidate ideology is closely tied to the number of challengers that an incumbent faces. Because the number of challengers is the key determinant of the incumbent's primary vulnerability (each challenger can decrease the incumbent's vote share by 12% in Table 1 ), it is important that the number of challengers is largely tied to the ideological positioning of the incumbent. Incumbents who veer from their primary constituency are much more likely to draw challengers and thus are more vulnerable to primary defeat.
The third condition necessary for a true strategic dilemma to exist is the presence of ideologically extreme primary challengers. The divergence of primary-and general-election constituencies is a problem for incumbents only if primary voters have an alternative candidate they could choose who is closer to their preferences. Unfortunately, since most primary challengers lose, we do not have any systematic measures of their ideological positions. We did, however, examine newspaper and journalistic accounts of congressional primary losses from 1982 to 2000 to determine the ideological location of challengers. To maintain consistency, we used two sources: the biannual Almanac of American Politics and the weekly newspaper Roll Call These publications consistently covered all the primary races in which the incumbent lost. We found that in 71% of the cases, primary challengers were ideologically more extreme than the incumbent. In these cases and most others, Democratic incumbents who were too conservative for their primary constituency were beaten by moreliberal primary challengers (and vice versa for Republicans). Although this examination of media accounts is not a perfect test, it does substantiate our argument that the third condition is in place, namely, that primary challengers often challenge incumbents from the ideological extreme.
It seems clear from our findings that a strategic dilemma does, in fact, exist for congressional candidates. Primary electorates favor different candidates than general electorates, and challengers are quick to find ideologically vulnerable incumbents. Why are primary elections a better venue for more-ideological interests? Key (1964) writes, "[I]t seems evident that certain classes of persons, by voting heavily in primaries, gain special influence at this crucial stage in the democratic process" (581). Low-turnout elections are a smaller electoral venue where small groups of ideological voters can have a disproportionate impact on the outcome (Aldrich 1983) . Figure 2 illustrates the average turnout for contested primary and general elections for the period 1956-1998. General-election turnout is, on average, approximately three times the size of primary-election turnout. Even in the most contested primaries -where the incumbent lost -average turnout was around 90,000 voters, still considerably lower than turnout in the general election. Although fewer voters does not necessarily imply different voters, it is clear that the subset of voters voting in the primary is likely an unrepresentative subset of the general electorate. Moreover, unlike in the general election, turnout is relatively stable across both on-and off-presidential election years in primaries, suggesting that primary elections draw a more-stable base of voters. In the general election, turnout is consistently higher in presidential election years and drops in off-years.
In sum, to demonstrate that congressional candidates face a strategic-positioning dilemma, we required three conditions to be met. First, the effects of candidate ideology on vote margins had to be different in primary elections and general elections. We found that candidates who are ideologically closer to the preferences of the general-election constituency do better in general elections, but they FIGURE 2 A Comparison of Primary-and General-Election Turnout, 1956 -1998 do worse in primary elections. In fact, Democrats who are more liberal than their districts and Republicans who are more conservative than their districts do better in primary elections. Second, threat of electoral loss in the primary had to be made credible by the fact that ideological moderation generally leads to more primary challengers, making an incumbent much more vulnerable. We found evidence of this threat. Finally, available data on primary challengers had to indicate that they do, in fact, tend to be ideologically more extreme than the incumbents. We have presented these data. These three conditions support the idea that there is a strategic dilemma presented to congressional candidates.
The Response of Congressional Candidates to the Strategic Dilemma
The question now is, how do candidates position themselves between the divergent preferences of the primary and general electorates? We argue that congressional candidates respond by hewing closer to their primary constituencies. It is observationally difficult to examine candidate positions and untangle the effect of primary elections from factors like party pressure. We can, however, examine primary losses to see if candidate ideology contributes to primary loss. We compared some descriptive data on incumbents who lost in the primary with data on those who won. We organized the data by decade to examine the possibility of historical trends in the data. First, we must point out that primary losses are truly rare events. Across the 9,560 races in our dataset, there are only 122 primary losses, which constitute about 1% of all primary races. Consistent with our expectations, primary losers are generally more ideologically moderate than the winners. Losing Democrats are more conservative with respect to the general constituency than are winning Democrats, and losing Republicans are more liberal than winning Republicans. Additionally, primary losers are generally quite junior. For instance, in the 1980s, the typical House Democrat had served almost 6 terms, but the average primary loser had served only 1.6 terms. Across all decades and in both parties, primary losers have, on average, served two fewer terms than their peers.
The descriptive data support our hypothesis that primary losses are most likely to happen among ideologically moderate candidates. We also ran a simple logistic regression of primary loss on ideology and other measures of competitiveness. We coded the dependent variable as 1 for a defeat and as 0 for a victory. We divided the sample by party. As in our analyses of vote percentage, we restricted the sample to contested races and ran three different models. Table 4 presents the results. With respect to the ideological dynamics, the results are much as expected: liberal Democrats are less likely to lose in the primary election.19 Holding all other variables at their mean, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in conservatism increases the probability of loss among Democrats by half a percentage point. Although these results initially seem negligible, when we consider that only 1% of all incumbents lose, half a percentage point seems more significant. Among Republicans, the results move in the expected direction but are not statistically significant -perhaps because primary losses are such a rare event among Republicans. Throughout all the models, the effect of seniority on primary loss is clear and statistically significant: Democrats and Republicans who have served more terms in office are much less likely to lose. Predicted probabilities show that a Democrat who has served one House term has a 4% chance of primary loss; a Democrat who has served two terms has only a 2% chance of primary loss. In other words, one term's difference cuts the Democrat's chance of primary loss in half. For Republicans, a first-term member has a 2% chance of losing; a member who has served two terms has a less than Increased competitiveness due to redistricting and an increased number of challengers can also have a statistically significant effect on increasing the probability of primary loss. Here, the primary-election system variables appear not to matter for incumbent losses: neither open nor closed primaries have anything approaching a statistically significant effect, no doubt in large part because primary losses are very rare events. This pattern also mostly holds for money raised in primary elections. Although the variable moves in the expected direction, the results are not significant (except in the third model for Democrats). Considering the extremely small number of losses, we find the fact that this statistical procedure turns up a significant effect at all (even if only for Democrats) impressive. These results suggest that legislators -although adept at avoiding a serious primary challenge -do need to respect the possibility of primary-election defeat. Defeat is a low probability event, but a moderate legislator, particularly among Democrats, is in danger of losing his or her seat in the primary election.
To think further about the pattern of primary losses, we turn to some qualitative data on the history of primary elections. There is reason to believe that the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s spawned a greater number of ideological voters and the rise of new issues on the public agenda. Research has shown a burgeoning of organized interests emerging from this time period (Berry 1984 (Berry , 1989 Schlozman and Tierney 1986) , and some scholars speculate that these interests are more likely to play a role in primary elections. Qualitative data on primary losses during this time period indicate that candidates who did not appeal to an ideological base fared worse in the primary.
In 1970, a number of the incumbents who were defeated in the primary lost because of the opposition of an organized interest.20 In California's district 7 (Berkeley), Ronald V. Dellums defeated liberal incumbent Jeffery Cohelan (a former labor organizer) by emphasizing Dellums 's affiliation with the Black Panthers. In Colorado's district 1, Democrat Byron Rogers had held the seat since 1950. Craig Barnes organized an effective primary challenge against him by mobilizing disaffected environmentalists and peace activists in the district, who were disillusioned with Rogers. In Maryland's district 4, Democratic incumbent George Fallon, who had served from 1944 to 1970, was defeated by the insurgent Paul Sarbanes, who capitalized upon his personal friendship with Ralph Nader and accepted financial and volunteer support from peace and ecology groups. In Maryland's district 7, Parren Mitchell also relied on the support of activist peace groups, as well as his brother's affiliation with the NAACP, to defeat the incumbent. In New York's district 19, longtime civil rights activist Bella Azbug campaigned hard to defeat incumbent Leonard Farbstein (Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews 1972) .
In these and multiple other cases around 1970, interest groups were able to organize for and against candidates, making themselves a potent force in primary elections. Two of the perhaps most striking stories come from 1972. In Colorado's district 4 and Nevada's at-large seat race, environmental groups finally defeated long-standing environmental foes Wayne Aspinall and Walter Baring. Aspinall was the powerful chair of the House Interior Committee and played a large role in blocking wilderness legislation through the 1960s. In 1970, he faced his first primary opposition in 22 years and narrowly eked out a victory. In 1972, environmentalists were successful in defeating him. Environmentalists were similarly strategic in defeating Baring, who was the most conservative Democratic representative outside the South and was dangerously climbing the congressional ladder to seniority in the House Interior Committee; in 1972, Baring was also defeated in the primary by environmental activists.
We find 1970 a particularly interesting year to examine, since it is the year of the most primary losses among incumbents in a nonredistricting year. We suspect it is emblematic of the larger historical pattern in this period. Figure 3 plots the number of primary losses over time, without redistricting years.21 From this graph, it is clear that the number of primary losses in a nonredistricting year never rises above 10. The number of losses does, however, rise through the 1960s and peaks in 1970, when 10 incumbents lost in primary elections. If we treat the relatively high number of losses in and around 1970 as an exogenous shock to the system, wherein incumbents witnessed their colleagues losing in primaries because those members did not appeal to organized interests, then we should expect the number of primary losses to decline after 1970 (see Aldrich 1995 for explication of a similar idea). Prior to 1970, primary losses accounted for approximately 26% of all incumbent losses in a given year. In 1970, primary losses accounted for a stunning 83% of all losses in that year. After 1970, primary losses accounted for less than 20% of incumbent losses each year. It seems likely that candidates learned to respect the potential threat of primary defeat by observing their losing colleagues in the early 1970s. Historical data on candidate positioning also indicate that members have increasingly distanced themselves from the district median over time.
FIGURE 3
Number of Incumbent Primary Losses per Year, 1956 Year, -1998 (without redistricting years)
Descriptive data in Table 3 show some of this effect. T-tests also indicate that the difference between members' positions relative to the general electorate before and after 1970 is statistically significant. This trend, coupled with our brief exploration of the qualitative data, supports the idea that candidates who do not appeal to an ideological base of organized voters are more likely to lose in the primaries and, further, provides some evidence that the explosion of organized interests in the late 1960s prompted candidates to worry about the threat of a primary defeat.22 Together with our analysis of primary losses, these findings provide evidence consistent with the idea that primary elections can pull candidates to ideological extremes. Candidates who have not served many terms and are ideologically moderate are more likely to lose, and our examination of historical data indicates that candidates may be adjusting their behavior in response to historical trends.
Conclusions
This article has established several key facts about primary elections. First, congressional candidates face a strategic-positioning dilemma. Low turnout in primary elections creates the conditions necessary for a small group of ideologically extreme voters to have a greater impact. Our analysis shows that candidates who fare well in general elections often do poorly in primary elections. Democrats who are more liberal than their general-election constituency do better in the primary election, and vice versa for Republicans who are more conservative than their generalelection constituency. In addition, ideologically moderate incumbents are more likely to draw primary challengers, which greatly increases their vulnerability in primary elections. Our examination of challengers who defeat incumbents in primary elections also shows that these challengers tend to be ideologically more extreme than the incumbents, thus creating an important strategic dilemma for the candidates.
Second, our analysis of patterns of primary losses provides support for the expectation that congressional candidates who face a strategic dilemma between primary constituencies and general-election constituencies will work to build up a primary-election constituency (Fenno 1978) . More ideologically moderate incumbents are more likely to lose, especially if they have not served many terms in the House. Finally, a look at over-time trends in primary losses intimates that candidates who observed the striking number of primary losses around 1 970 were likely to learn from this observation and adjust their behavior accordingly. Thus, we see fewer losses after the early 1970s.
The combination of these findings leads us to believe that a primary-election effect in House primary elections is not only plausible, but quite likely. This evidence substantiates some speculation that changing trends in primary elections may be a source of increased polarization in Congress over the past several decades. Our ability to make broader claims is limited by the lack of better measures of each district's primary-election constituency. Nonetheless, our data provide the best available estimates of the relationship between candidate ideology and primary elections over time. With better measures, however, we could perform better tests of the kinds of strategic choices that candidates make under a variety of electoral circumstances. Future studies of congressional elections should therefore focus on primary constituencies. In sum, our findings on the relationship between candidate ideology and primary-election outcomes offer the possibility of a fruitful research agenda in the future. 1. Although some scholars (Geer 1988; Stone and Abramovitz 1983; Stone and Rapoport 1994) argue that the ideological extremity of the primary electorate does not make a difference in candidate selection, those scholars still find that the views of presidential primary voters are more extreme. Other work on primaries shows that presidential candidates react to this strategic dilemma by catering to the primary electorate (e.g., Polsby and Wildavsky 2004) .
2. It is worth noting that popular accounts of presidential campaigns often recognize presidential candidates trying to move back toward the ideological middle ground after winning the party nomination. For reasons that we discuss later, moving back and forth between the two constituencies is probably more difficult for congressional candidates.
3. The general-elections dataset is based on data collected by David W. Brady and used in multiple publications (e.g., Brady 1988; Brady, Cooper, and Hurley 1979; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002) . That dataset was originally collected from America Votes and checked against state electoral records (for more-recent years) and other sources, such as the Almanac of American Politics and Congressional Quarterly 's Guide to Elections. We then used a similar process to build the primaryelections dataset. We collected the data from America Votes and checked the results against state electoral records (where available) and the same sources as the generalelections dataset. This iterative process of checking and cleaning the data gives us confidence that it is an accurate representation of electoral outcomes.
4. Although incumbents are defeated far less often in primary elections than in general elections, some scholars may say that congressional primaries are not very important affairs, merely a pro forma exercise required to win the nomination. But many rare events -such as presidential vetoes -produce important effects in politics. 5. Although this book (Alvarez 1997 ) is about presidential elections, there is no reason to believe that the argument does not apply equally well to congressional elections.
6. This phenomenon also appears within the party leadership. As far back as the 1 890s, party leaders have been further left and further right than the median voter (Cooper and Brady 1981) .
7. Central to this literature are findings by Calvert (1985) and Alesina (1988) that, even when candidates have ideological preferences, policy divergence results only when there is uncertainty about voter preferences, a lack of constraint in policy choices once elected, or both. See Grofman 2004 for a review of this work. 8. It is important to note that ideological positioning is one part of a larger process through which candidates seek votes. A broad range of scholarly research examines other ways in which candidates generate votes (e.g., Bianco 1994; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Canon 1999; Fenno 1978; and Mayhew 1974) . All of this work, however, acknowledges the importance and centrality of ideological positioning in the larger process of vote getting. 9. See Levendusky, Pope, and Jackman 2004 for a more-formal discussion of presidential vote in the district as a measure of constituency preference. 10. Alternative polynomial specifications of the regression and additional control variables did little or nothing to change the model. For an extended discussion of this model and its application to polarization in Congress, see Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002 and Han and Brady N.d . 1 1 . We ran this regression and all the other regressions presented in this article using adjusted ADA scores and DW-Nominate. For simplicity, we only present the DW-Nominate results. The results from the ADA regressions are completely consistent with the results presented here and are available from the authors upon request. 12. We defined contested as having at least one primary opposition candidate who received any votes and whose name was on the ballot.
13. We counted any district that was redistricted at all as being redistricted, regardless of the extent of reapportionment. 14. We collected these data in each state for each year in our dataset by examining relevant legal codes. Although there are some gaps in our data (where we were unable to conclusively determine the relevant law), we have close to 95% of the cases classified in the data. 15. These data came from the FEC archives and were obviously available only for recent elections (we were able to collect data for 1980 to 1998). The FEC classifies this fund-raising by date, and for this model we have only included funds raised before the primary election. Although most models studying the effect of money on elections use expenditures instead of revenue, we were not able to find historical data that indicated how much money was spent in a primary election, relative to a general election.
16. It is important to note that the dependent variable in Gerber and Morton's 1998 study is candidate ideology. Our dependent variable is vote margins, and we are therefore examining a different set of relationships.
17. This figure excludes cases in which there was redistricting or a scandal. In these scenarios, the incumbent is rendered vulnerable not because of ideological positioning, but because of a change in the district composition or a personal scandal. In other words, an exogenous event interrupts the expected pattern and changes the dynamics of the race. Even if we include redistricting and scandals, however, we find that the challengers were more extreme than the incumbent almost 60% of the time.
18. Von Dongen, Rachel, "Forbes Ousted in New York Primary," Roll Call, 14
Sept. 2000. 19. This is true for the first and third models presented in Table 4 . The results in the second model (with both money raised and the number of challengers) are not statistically significant, presumably because multicollinearity increases the uncertainty around our estimates (as discussed with respect to Table 1 ).
20. We should note that this pattern of loss is also consistent with our expectation that primary challengers tend to be ideologically extreme. A number of these incumbents were beaten by challengers supported by ideologically extreme organized interests.
21. We expect that redistricting produces more primary losses, since there are newly created districts in which two incumbents must run against each other. If incumbents are of the same party, then one must necessarily lose in the primary election.
22. Of course, this is not a definitive explanation, since any number of other factors can account for the change after the 1970s. One alternative explanation is that new issues came up on the legislative agenda, such as women's issues, environmentalism, and the Vietnam War. Examining the relationship between the rise of new issues and the mobilization of interest groups and these factors' impacts on primary elections is research we intend to pursue. For now, however, it is clear that the primaries of the 1970s were distinctive, either in terms of the new issues they brought up or in the increased use of interest group mobilization.
